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As THE  U.S.  unemployment rate fell during 1988 and early 1989 into the 
5-5.5 percent range, observers worried about upward pressure on wage 
inflation. The concern grew naturally out of the experience of the 1970s, 
when wage inflation accelerated  whenever  the unemployment  rate fell 
into the 6-7 percent range. But while such concern is understandable, it 
may be misplaced. Imagine an economic historian painting the following 
broad picture of the American labor market. 
After  two back-to-back  recessions, and  some adverse  developments  in the legal 
climate  for unions, a period  of calm descended  on the labor  market.  Wage and 
price inflation  receded against  a background  of relatively  high  unemployment. 
There was general concern that wage-setting practices and the climate of 
employment  relations  within  firms  was harmful  to U.S. international  competi- 
tiveness. Employers  pushed  for relaxations  of workrules  and  wage  freezes. The 
advance  -of union pay relative to nonunion was halted. Experiments were 
undertaken  with flexible  pay systems such as profit  sharing  in autos and gain 
sharing  in other  industries. 
While  there were some dramatic  labor-management  confrontations,  strike 
activity  fell  notably.  Cooperation  seemed  to be more  in  vogue  than  confrontation. 
Job  insecurity,  linked  to both  high  unemployment  and  the spreading  application 
of computers  to the workplace,  enabled  employers  to obtain  concessions and 
cooperation  in exchange for job guarantees  and retraining  programs  for the 
displaced. 
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Experts warned that the better paying new jobs would go to those with 
professional  and  technical  knowledge  and  projected  a drying  up  of opportunities 
for  obtaining  high-wage  blue-collarjobs.  Fears  were  expressed  that  the  American 
educational  system  was not turning  out graduates  with skills  needed  by the labor 
market,  perhaps  leading  to a two-tier  society with prospects  of low wages and 
limited  job opportunities  for those on the bottom.  At the same  time  there  would 
be a dearth  of employees  with skills needed  to meet the foreign  challenge. 
In time, however, demand  expanded  and the unemployment  rate declined. 
Accompanying  the decline  were increased  reports  of labor  shortages.  Dissident 
movements arose in the union sector, challenging  union officials who had 
previously  negotiated  contracts  with low wage gains or who were seen as too 
cozy with  management.  Contracts  negotiated  by union  officials  were sometimes 
rejected  by rank  and file votes. Union officials,  feeling the pressure,  reminded 
management  at companies  such  as Chrysler  of previous  concessions  during  hard 
times and  demanded  recoupment.  Inflation  of wages and  prices  accelerated. 
The account, apparently of the labor market during the 1980s, actually 
describes  the late 1950s and early 1960s. The back-to-back recessions, 
for example,  occurred in 1957-58 and 1960-61.  The unfavorable legal 
development  for unions  to  which  the  story refers was  the  Landrum- 
Griffin Act of 1959. Concerns about international competitiveness  were 
easy to find in that era, as the world shifted from dollar shortage to dollar 
surplus. Employers  did mount a bargaining campaign leading to wage 
freezes  in some  industries,  notably  steel.  Flexible  pay  systems  were 
negotiated at American Motors and Kaiser Steel.  Workrule relaxations 
in exchange forjob security were prominently featured in the West Coast 
longshore contracts. Labor Department projections emphasizing a drying 
up of blue-collar jobs  and an expansion  in technical  and professional 
fields  were  widely  publicized.1  Finally,  as  unemployment  fell  in the 
1960s, reports of labor shortages were heard with increasing frequency, 
and  dissident  movements  in  unions  led  to  contract  rejections  and 
pressures on incumbent union officials.2 Concession  bargaining waned.3 
Despite  notable  differences-deliberately  suppressed  in the  above 
story, but discussed  later-between  the 1960s and the 1980s, the simi- 
larities are sufficiently striking to make a strong case for seeking clues 
in the 1960s, rather than the 1970s, to the likely outcome  of the recent 
1. For  example,  Bienstock  (1962). 
2. Mitchell  (1980,  pp. 51-52);  Sheahan  (1967,  pp. 57-60). 
3. The  opening  hypothetical  quotation  referred  to pressure  on Chrysler  in 1964  by auto 
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drop in unemployment  below 5.5 percent. During the 1970s, several 
developments made the economy unusually inflation-prone,  pushing 
many estimates of the nonaccelerating  inflation  rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU) above 6 percent. The two most striking  developments  were 
the divergence of food and energy prices from the trend followed by 
other  prices  and  the deterioration  of productivity. 
Through  the 1960s,  domestic farm  prices were generally  kept in line 
with other  prices through  government  inventory  policies. Stocks, how- 
ever, were depleted  during  the late 1960s  so that  by the 1970s  this policy 
no longer  worked.4  Until the 1970s,  too, U.S. energy  prices  were partly 
insulated  from  external  pressures  by a quota  system, and  OPEC  had  not 
yet learned how to control world oil prices. In addition, world fixed 
exchange  rates  tended  to keep  international  prices  from  gyrating  in dollar 
terms and from rapidly  changing  the competitive  position of American 
firms. 
Thus, during  1959-69, the official  consumer  price index (CPI)  and a 
component measure of underlying  inflation that excluded food and 
energy prices both rose at the same 2.3 percent annual rate. During 
1969-79, however, the figures  for the two measures were 7.1 percent 
and  5.7 percent,  respectively.  Price  volatility  also increased  in  the 1970s.5 
A divergence thus developed between measured price inflation and 
employer  "ability  to pay," that is, between the real wage and product 
wage. 
The productivity  slowdown after 1973, combined with these price 
developments,  made obsolete the traditional  notion of "3 percent plus 
COLA"  as an appropriate  guide to wage setting. However, a failure  to 
recognize  these changes-and a spread  of union  COLA  coverage  due to 
higher  inflation  (or  inflation  uncertainty)  and  wage controls  incentives- 
caused union wages to rise faster than nonunion  until the early 1980s. 
And in aggregate,  real wages (deflated  by an appropriate  "domestic" 
deflator)  rose faster than productivity  in the 1970s. Both tendencies 
4. Hathaway  (1974). 
5. The official  index  is CPI-U  after 1978  and CPI-W  before. For underlying  inflation, 
all  items  less food  and  energy  have  been  used  through  1967  and  all items  less food, energy, 
and  shelter  thereafter.  (The  latter  measure  excludes  problems  introduced  by the inclusion 
of mortgage  interest  rates  in the CPI  during  this  period.  However,  it was not  available  until 
1968.)  The standard  deviation  of year-over-year  CPI changes during 1959-69 was 1.5 
percentage  points.  During  1969-79,  it was 3.3 percentage  points. U  w  X  m  N  o  N  t}  t;  oo  oo  rq  rqr  o 
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reversed  in the 1980s,  contributing  to a climate  of wage quiescence that 
resembled  that  of the early 1960s.6 
Other  forces that  may  have put  greater  pressure  on wages in the 1970s 
than in the 1980s include such intangibles as social turmoil, youth 
rebellion,  and  the entrance  of the baby  boom into employment. 
All these differences  between the 1970s  and 1980s  suggest strongly 
that  the NAIRU-originally conceived as a relatively  fixed concept-is 
actually subject to considerable  variation  across periods. An obvious 
short-term  issue is whether  unemployment  below 5.5 percent  (as achieved 
in late 1988  and 1989)  is now compatible  with  price stability.  And related 
to that is whether there are long-term  institutional  changes in labor 
markets  that  are reflected  in a changing  NAIRU. 
Initial Comparisons:  1960s and 1980s 
Table 1 summarizes  wage and  price  trends  and  annual  unemployment 
rates  in 1983-89  and 1962-67.  Of special  interest  is the contrast  between 
1988, during which unemployment averaged 5.5  percent (and was 
declining),  and 1964,  in which unemployment  averaged  5.2 percent  and 
again was declining. The various wage inflation  indicators  in 1988 all 
accelerated,  although  the acceleration  halted  during  the first  half  of 1989 
when  the  unemployment  rate  stopped  falling.  In 1964,  only  compensation 
per  hour  accelerated-apparently because of a combination  of increased 
overtime  hours and payments  and supervisory  salaries.7  Not until 1965 
(and,  on the price side, 1966)  was inflation  acceleration  apparent. 
6. For example, compensation  per hour divided  by the business deflator  (the same 
deflator  used to generate  productivity  and unit  labor  cost data)  rose 0.9 percent  annually 
during  1973-79, although  output per hour rose only 0.6 percent. During 1979-88, the 
figures  were 1.2  percent  and 1.3 percent,  respectively. 
7.  Unadjusted  average hourly earnings  in manufacturing  rose 3.3 percent in 1964 
compared  with  2.5 percent  for straight-time  hourly  earnings.  The 0.8 percent  difference  is 
due  to increased  overtime,  since otherwise  the indexes  would  be identical.  Unfortunately, 
data  on overtime  effects  are  not available  for other  sectors  of the economy.  Private  wages 
and  salaries  per  full-time  equivalent  worker  from  the national  income  accounts  jumped  5.0 
percent  in 1964  (and  then fell back to 3.4 percent  in 1965),  whereas  unadjusted  average 
hourly  earnings  rose 3.5 percent.  If it is assumed  that the 0.8 percent  due to overtime  in 
manufacturing  applied  to all sectors, then  0.7 percent  remains  of the 1.5  percent  difference 
in the two indexes  and  may  be due to differences  in occupational  coverage.  The principal 
difference  between  the  indexes  in  that  regard  is inclusion  of nonproduction  and  supervisory 
workers  in the national  income  measure.  Hence, an upward  move in white-collar  salaries 
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The difference  between developments in 1964 and 1988, it will be 
argued  below, is explained  by a combination  of increased  regional  labor 
market  diversity in the 1980s and institutional  changes in labor and 
product markets since the 1960s that reduce lags between demand 
impulses and wage reactions. These changes, it will be argued, have 
long-term  macroeconomic  significance  that goes beyond trying  to esti- 
mate the NAIRU of the late 1980s. Indeed, the fact that institutional 
changes  can shift the NAIRU suggests that NAIRU estimates ought  to 
be viewed as variables  rather  than  immutable  constants. 
Several  potential  explanations  for  why, despite  similar  unemployment 
rates, the labor  market  of 1988  might  be tighter  than  the market  of 1964 
turn  out to be either  unconvincing  or difficult  to assess. The first  is that 
changes over the years in the demographic  weights underlying the 
unemployment  rate  could  obscure  relative  tightness.  Second,  differences 
in the perceived  economic outlook may have favored  wage advances in 
1988.  Third,  labor  markets  may have become less efficient  in the sense 
that  higher  vacancy  rates  existed in 1988  than  in 1964  despite  the roughly 
comparable  official  unemployment  rates. Such inefficiency  could  be due 
to some institutional  change (such as a shift in the unemployment 
insurance  program)  or a decline in labor quality of entry-age  workers 
(forcing  employers  to search longer  to find  needed worker  characteris- 
tics). Fourth, the baby bust phenomenon  may have cut the supply of 
entry-age workers, thus creating a chronic tendency toward labor 
shortage. 
Changes  in Demographic  Weights 
Table 2 presents a detailed contrast  between the official  unemploy- 
ment rate and alternative  indexes of unemployment  in 1964  and 1988. 
On the basis of pure  demographics  there is little difference  between the 
two years. In 1964,  the baby boom was  just beginning  to enter  the labor 
market; in  1988 the baby boom was departing from the entry-age 
category. The proportion  of men in the labor force was higher  in 1964 
than in 1988, but male unemployment  rates rose relative to those of 
women in the 1980s,  thus reducing  the impact  of the higher  proportion 
of women. 
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Table  2. Comparative  Unemployment  Data, 1964  and 1988 
Percent  except as noted 
Indicator  1964  1988 
Civilian  unemployment  rate  5.2  5.5 
Adult  males, aged 25-54  3.2  4.4 
Proportion  of unemployed 
Full-time  workers  83.9  80.0 
Part-time  workers  15.7  20.0 
Less than  five weeks  44.8  46.0 
Female  41.8  45.5 
Aged 16-19  23.0  18.3 
Aged 20-24  17.4  18.8 
Mean  duration  of unemployment  (weeks)  13.3  13.5 
Normalized  help-wanted  advertising  with Abraham  adjustment 
(index, 1964 =  100)a  100  94 
Standard  deviation  of state unemployment  rates divided  by meanb  0.24  0.34 
Standard  deviation  of demographic  unemployment  rates divided 
by meanc  0.68  0.68 
Weighted  unemployment  rates 
1964  demographic  weightsc  5.2  5.5 
1988  demographic  weightsc  5.3  5.5 
1988  payroll  weightsd  4.4  4.9 
Perry  weights  3.1  4.0 
Civilian  participation  rate  55.7  62.3 
Nonagricultural  full-time  workers  42.3  46.9 
Sources:  1988  payroll  weights  calculated  from  data  from  the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics.  Perry  weights  provided 
by George  L. Perry,  the Brookings  Institution.  Normalized  help-wanted  advertising  calculated  from  data  in Survey 
of Current  Business,  1965  and 1989,  p. S-16  and  S-14, respectively,  and  in Employment  and  Earnings  (January  1989), 
table B. 1. State unemployment  rates found  in Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  "State and Regional  Unemployment  in 
1988,"  USDL report  89-73,  February  17, 1989,  and  Manpower  Report  of the President  (1965).  Nonagricultural  full- 
time workers  from  BLS (1989c)  anid  BLS (1965).  All other  data  for 1988  from  Employment  and Earnings  (January 
1989).  All other  data  for 1964  from  BLS (1988). 
a. Conference  Board  help-wanted  advertising  index  divided  by nonagricultural  payroll  employment  and adjusted 
by factor  suggested  in Abraham  (1987)  projected  to 1988. 
b. Includes  the District  of Columbia  as a state. 
c. Demographic  weights  are  based  on the proportion  of various  groups  in the labor  force  and  apply  to the following 
age groups  by sex: 16-19, 20-24, 25-54, 55-64, 65 and  up. 
d. Payroll  estimates  are based  on full-time  and  part-time  median  weekly  earnings  by demographic  group. 
used, prime-age  men  will count  for more  in the calculations  because they 
earn  more  per hour  than women do and also tend to work more hours. 
The  Perry-weighted  unemployment  measure  puts especially  high  weight 
on prime-age men and is  in fact scaled to  resemble their average 
unemployment  rate.8  As can be seen from  table 2, using any unemploy- 
8.  Perry (1972). 198  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
ment  index that  puts heavy weight  on men will indeed suggest  a slacker 
labor  market  in 1988  than  in 1964. 
Women,  however, are disproportionately  among  the new additions, 
as opposed  to the incumbents,  in the  labor  market.  One  contrast  between 
1964  and 1988  is the significantly  higher  labor  market  participation  rate 
of women  relative  to men  in the latter  year. If new hires  are  what  matters 
for wage setting, then unemployment  indexes that put low weight on 
females  may  not adequately  reflect  demand  pressures.  As will be argued 
below, there is reason to believe that the labor market  in the 1980s  is 
more  sensitive  to outsiders  than  insiders,  relative  to the 1960s.  Thus, the 
rationale  that  has traditionally  been put  forward  for special  emphasis  on 
unemployment  of adult men is being eroded by changing  labor market 
conditions. 
Economic  Outlook 
If the economic outlook was seen as more  definitely  expansionary  in 
1988 than in 1964, employers might have been more willing to raise 
wages that year than their counterparts  were in 1964. However, if 
anything, the outlook during much of  1988 was gloomier and more 
uncertain  than it was in 1964.  The Kennedy assassination  in late 1963 
was undoubtedly  a source of some uncertainty  in early 1964.  However, 
there was no reason to believe that President Johnson's economic 
policies would shift away from the expansionary  emphasis laid out in 
the Kennedy administration,  as economists of the period pointed out. 
Kennedy  policies had  been explicitly  aimed  at taking  the unemployment 
rate down to 4 percent, well below the level prevailing  in early 1964.9 
And 1964 was also the year in which the famous tax cut, favored by 
administration  economists  on Keynesian  grounds,  was finally  achieved. 
Economic  forecasting  was generally  "subjective" rather  than econ- 
ometric  in the early 1960s.  The business outlook panel of the National 
Industrial  Conference  Board, most of whose members  assumed that a 
tax cut would be enacted, forecast an average unemployment  rate for 
9.  "A Shock,  Then  Recovery,"  Business Week  (November  30, 1963),  pp. 92-93. The 
4 percent civilian unemployment  target would be equivalent  to 3.8-3.9 percent under 
current  definitions  because  of methodological  changes  in the collection  of unemployment 
data  made  in 1967.  These  included  slight  wording  changes  in  the  Current  Population  Survey 
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1964  of 5.5 percent, falling  to 5.3 percent by the fourth  quarter.'0  This 
view turned  out to understate  the actual  rate of unemployment  decline, 
although  it did suggest a continuing  drop in unemployment.  Compen- 
diums  of forecasts  were not published  during  this period,  so it is difficult 
to know how typical  the panel's view was. However, it might  be noted 
that the administration's  own forecast for 1964 correctly called for 
unemployment  to decline to about  5 percent  by the end of the year. 
Whatever  the sources  of pessimism  in 1964,  their  impact  on forecaster 
expectations was clearly eclipsed by that of the October 1987 stock 
market crash. The consensus forecast for economic expansion was 
reduced  by the crash, with some forecasters  projecting  outright  reces- 
sion. That  the crash  would  not in fact provoke  a recession was not clear 
for several months into 1988. Thus, if anything,  the outlook during  at 
least the first half of 1988 was more pessimistic than it was in 1964. 
Although  the economy expanded  in the second half  of 1988,  forecasters, 
anticipating  a monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve, became 
cautious again about 1989-90. It is hard to argue, therefore, that the 
economic outlook caused inflation  to accelerate more quickly in 1988 
than  in 1964. 
Labor Market Inefficiency 
A third  source of increased  pressure  on wages at a given unemploy- 
ment rate in 1988 could be deteriorating  labor market efficiency in 
matchingjobs  and  workers  since 1964.  In  particular,  Katharine  Abraham 
has suggested that the ratio of the vacancy rate to the unemployment 
rate  has increased.  "I 
Because official data on vacancy rates are not collected, direct 
observation  of the Beveridge  ratio is not possible. Help-wanted  adver- 
tising, "normalized"  by, that is, deflated by, employment, has been 
suggested  as a proxy for the vacancy rate. Table  3 compares  this proxy 
with a vacancy rate for the  1960s calculated from data from state 
Employment  Service agencies. (These data are not available for the 
1980s.)  Both series tell about the same story: 1964  saw some pickup  in 
vacancies,  but  much  largerjumps  occurred  in  late 1965  and  1966,  followed 
by a small  decline  during  the "growth  recession" of 1967. 
10. National  Industrial  Conference  Board  (1963). 
11. Abraham  (1987). 200  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
Table 3.  Job Vacancies Pending at State Employment Services and Normalized 
Help-wanted Advertising, 1962-67 
Item  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
Number of vacancies  (thousands)a  513  525  541  608  543  496 
Vacancies  as percent of job 
openings  received  33  35  38  49  60  56 
Normalized  help-wanted advertising 
(index,  1964 =  100)b  92  91  100  120  142  132 
Source:  Pending  vacancies  from Emiploymtient  Service  Statistics,  various  issues.  Help-wanted  advertising  from 
Bureau of Economic  Analysis  (1985) and from Emtiployvtmenit  and Earninlgs (January 1989), table B.1. 
a.  In December  of year indicated. 
b.  Conference  Board help-wanted advertising index divided by nonagricultural employment. 
As Abraham  has pointed out, the help-wanted  index was affected 
after  the mid-  1960s  by equal  employment  opportunity  regulation  (which 
encouraged  advertising  of job openings), changes in industrial  organi- 
zation of the newspaper  industry,  and other  forces. Her corrections  for 
these influences by the mid-  1980s suggested a deflation factor for 
normalized  help-wanted  advertising  of about 1.35, increasing  by about 
0.8 percent  a year. Thus, by 1988,  the correction  factor  would be about 
1.39. 
As  can be seen in table 2,  normalized help-wanted advertising, 
adjusted  by Abraham's  suggested  factor,  was lower in 1988  than  in 1964. 
It remained  so during  the first  half of 1989,  despite the further  lowering 
of unemployment.  Thus, the inefficiency  found  by Abraham  in the mid- 
1980s  appears  to have mysteriously  disappeared.  It does not appear  that 
the vacancy-to-unemployment  ratio  in 1988-89  was substantially  higher 
than  it was in 1964.  Indeed,  the reverse may be true. 
Another source of labor market  inefficiency could be institutional 
changes that reduce incentives for the unemployed  to search for  jobs. 
Unemployment  insurance  (UI) is sometimes blamed for discouraging 
rapid  job search. Yet during  the 1980s  an exceptionally  low percentage 
of the jobless participated  in UI. The ratio of those receiving state UI 
benefits  to total  unemployment  fell from  42 percent  in 1964  to 35  percent 
in 1988.  In addition,  the ratio  of average  weekly UI benefits  to average 
weekly earnings  of production  and  nonsupervisory  workers  fell from  39 
percent  to 35 percent.  12 
12. Data  on UI coverage  and  payment  levels appear  in the annual  Economic Report of 
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Generally,  it would  be difficult  to make  a case that social welfare  and 
labor  standards  legislation  was less restrictive  in 1964  than  in 1988.  For 
example, the ratio of the federal minimum  wage to average hourly 
earnings was  higher in  1964 than in  1988. If there was  increased 
inefficiency  in the labor market  in 1988, it did not stem directly from 
public  policies. 
Labor market efficiency in matching workers and jobs might be 
reduced by changes in the quality of job applicants, if such a quality 
change reduced employers' ability to appraise prospective workers. 
There  is evidence, based on declines in SAT scores and  other  measures 
of school achievement, that quality  of new entrants  to the work force 
did  decline  after  the mid-1960s,  although  there  was some reversal  of this 
trend  in  the 1980s.  The  popular  press  has  often  carried  reports  of declining 
discipline  at the high  school level. However, not all measures  point  to a 
decline in labor force quality. The absenteeism rate for illness, for 
example, was lower in 1988 than in the mid-1960s.  And data on job- 
hunting  methods  used by the unemployed  do not suggest  a decline  in the 
vigor  of their  searching  process.  13 
Even if there  has been a quality  decline  in available  labor,  that  decline 
by itself would not necessarily  reduce labor  market  efficiency;  it could 
simply  result in reduced  wages for the lower-quality  job seekers. And, 
indeed,  the  ratio  of youth  to adult  wages  for  full-time  workers  has steadily 
declined,  as table  4 shows. Note, however, that  the decline  could  be due 
to demand-side  factors such as shifts in the industrial  and occupational 
composition  ofjob openings. 
Despite the ambiguity  of the available  information,  the suggestion  of 
a quality decline that has made it more difficult for employers to 
differentiate  applicants  cannot be ruled out. There have been reports 
that employers are having difficulty  finding  individuals  with adequate 
13. The proportion  of nonagricultural  employees not working  because of claimed 
illness was 1.4 percent  in 1964  compared  with 1.2 percent  in 1988,  according  to Current 
Population  Survey  data.  This  rate  rose in the late 1960s  and peaked  at 1.6 percent  during 
the early 1970s,  perhaps  a symptom  of social unrest in the workplace.  It has steadily 
declined  thereafter  despite  a rising  ratio  of those who are  absent  due to illness  who report 
they are receiving  sick pay. (The rate does not seem to show any short-term  cyclical 
effect.)  Data  on  job search  were not available  from  the Current  Population  Survey  before 
1970.  Since  that  date,  however,  the  number  ofjob-searching  methods  has  shown  an  upward 
trend  from  1.56  methods  used  (out  of six choices  in  the survey)  to 1.61  in 1988.  This  upward 
trend  occurs  within  demographic  groups  as well as for the total. 202  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2.1989 
Table 4.  Youth-Adult Ratio, Usual Weekly Earnings of Full-time Wage and Salary 
Earners, 1970-88,  Selected Yearsa 
Earnings  ratio  Youths  as percentage 
Year  Male  Female  of civilian  laborforce 
1970  70  92  21.6 
1975  64  80  24.1 
1980  61  79  23.7 
1983  55  74  21.7 
1984  55  72  21.1 
1985  54  71  20.5 
1986  53  71  19.8 
1987  54  70  19.2 
1988  54  70  18.5 
Sources:  Earnings  ratios for  1970 and  1975 from Bureau of  Labor  Statistics  (1982),  table B.25.  Ratios  for  1988 
from Employment  and Earnings  (January 1989). All other  earnings ratios from Bureau of  Labor  Statistics  (1988), 
table A.9.  Youths as percentage  of civilian labor force from Emiploymenit  anid Earnings  (January 1989), table 3. 
a.  Youths are individuals aged  16-24.  Adults are those  25 years and older. Ratios  computed from medians. 
basic skills.'4  An informal  telephone survey by the author (described 
more  fully  below)  found  that  42 percent  of management  respondents  had 
complaints  about  basic skill deficiencies  of new  job applicants.  Perhaps 
grade  inflation  and a tendency to pass along students  who do not meet 
minimum  standards  have  reduced  the information  content  of educational 
credentials. 
The Baby Bust 
The argument  that a labor shortage  is linked to the baby bust is not 
supported  by table 2. The proportion  of workers  aged 16-24 was about 
the same in 1964  and 1988.  If there  had  been a special shortage  of young 
workers,  it might  be expected  that  youth  wages would  have started  rising 
relative  to adult  wages by 1988,  with its 5.5 percent  unemployment  rate. 
No such  tendency  is evident  in table  4. Lack  of a minimum  wage  increase 
has undoubtedly  influenced  the youth-to-adult  wage ratio, although  it 
14. The National Association of Manufacturers  conducted a mail survey of small 
businesses. Only 15 percent  responded  that they were not having  problems  with their 
employees'  "education  and  training."  Thirty-seven  percent  complained  of math  deficien- 
cies, 30 percent  complained  of reading  and  writing  problems,  25 percent  had  difficulties  in 
training  their  employees,  and  50 percent  said  they had  problems  with  employee  ability  to 
resolve problems  independently.  These data  were kindly  provided  to me by Christian  N. 
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might  be noted that the data of table 4 are based on full-time  workers, 
whose wages are normally  higher than those of part-timers.  Perhaps 
shifts in the industrial  and occupational  composition of job openings 
were so adverse to youth that rising wages for them within industries 
and occupations  were obscured. But it is more likely that the effects of 
the baby  bust, whatever  they may turn  out to be, will be felt in the 1990s 
as the ratio  of young  people to the overall  work  force declines further. 
Regional  Labor Market Diversity 
Several  studies  have noted  that  increased  diversity  in  the labor  market 
could produce  a mix of tight and loose market  conditions, thus making 
the wage-setting  process more  inflation-prone  at any average  unemploy- 
ment rate.'"  Unemployment, for example, could vary widely across 
industries,  across  demographic  groups,  or  across  regions.  As the average 
unemployment  rate  fell, those groupings  with the lowest unemployment 
rates  would  bump  into  labor  shortage  situations  and  begin  raising  wages. 
The  data  used to calculate  the alternative  unemployment  rates  in table 
2 reveal  no increased  variation  in unemployment  by demographic  group. 
And earlier  studies do not suggest  that  differences  in unemployment  by 
industry  have widened.  16 However, regional  variation  in unemployment 
does seem  to have increased  notably  between 1964  and 1988,  as the table 
indicates.  In  addition,  partly  because  of the  already-mentioned  increased 
volatility  in relative  pricing  that  began  in the 1970s,  it is possible to have 
separate  boom-bust  cycles in agriculture,  oil, and manufacturing. 
This drift away from a uniform macroeconomy was particularly 
notable  in the northeastern  states, where  employers  have complained  of 
labor  shortages  for  several  years. One  Massachusetts  personnel  manager 
reported  in late 1986  that "we don't go through  applications  to pick the 
most qualified  people any more. Now we hire anybody  and say 'Be all 
that  you can be.'  "17  As might  be expected, such pressures  show up as 
an  upward  wage drift  in the northeastern  states relative  to the rest of the 
country.18  Table 5 shows a rise of wages in the Northeast relative to 
15. Abraham (1987); Baily (1984). 
16. Abraham (1987). 
17. Richter (1986). 
18.  Disparities in unemployment across regions are mirrored in other data as well. For 
example, the dispersion of per capita personal income showed a long-term narrowing trend 
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Table  5. Regional  Wage  Trends,  1983-88 
Percent  change 
Change in wage 
relative  to 
Midwest, 
Region  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1982-88 
Northeast  5.4  4.6  5.0  4.7  4.6  4.7  6.6 
South  5.1  4.9  4.2  3.4  2.6  3.6  1.5 
Midwest  4.9  4.5  3.9  2.9  3.1  3.1  ... 
West  5.6  3.6  4.6  2.7  2.4  3.3  0 
Source:  Current Wage Developments  (March 1989), table  15. Data refer to employment  cost  index for wages  and 
salaries, based on annual averages  of quarterly figures. 
those of the Midwest and West of more than 6 percent since the 1980s 
recovery  began. 
However, one must be cautious  about  exclusive reliance  on regional 
disparities in unemployment  as an explanation of seemingly higher 
NAIRUs. For example, Abraham's  data  suggest  that  disparities  in state 
unemployment  rates during  the late 1970s, when unemployment  was 
relatively  high,  were quite  low relative  to those during  later  years. Hiring 
survey data from Manpower,  Inc., suggest that in the late 1970s, the 
regional  and industrial  disparities  in net job openings were higher  than 
they have been in the late 1980s. Thus, in the late 1970s, diversified 
employer  demand  bumped  up against  constraints  in relatively uniform 
labor markets. During  the late 1980s, the reverse was true: in widely 
diversified  labor markets, employers have been uniformly  demanding 
more labor and bumping  against barriers  in those markets that were 
already  tight.  '9 
In short, of all the explanations  offered  so far  for why the 1980s  might 
be more inflation-prone  than the 1960s, regional  diversity seems most 
19. Mary  B. Stewart  of Manpower,  Inc., kindly  provided  me with  historical  data. On 
a quarterly  basis, the Manpower,  Inc., survey asks employers-broken down into 11 
industrial  sectors and 4 regions-whether they plan to increase  or decrease their work 
forces  in the next  quarter.  The  reports  use the difference  between  the percentage  planning 
increases  and  the percentage  planning  decreases  as an  index  of net hiring  intentions.  Using 
10 of the 11 sectors broken  down by region  and 1 sector (mining)  on a national  basis, I 
calculated  the standard  deviation  of net  intentions  for  the third  quarter  of 1978,  1979,  1988, 
and 1989  (surveyed  in the second quarter).  The standard  deviations  dropped  from 14.79 
and 11.97  in 1978  and 1979, respectively, to 9.12 and 8.04 in 1988  and 1989. Standard 
deviations  divided  by the mean  for these years  were  0.58, 0.59, 0.40, and  0.35. Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  205 
convincing.  Evidence  of a softening  of the previously  tight  northeastern 
labor  market  in the second  half  of 1989  relative  to other  regions  therefore 
suggests  a possible further  lowering  of the NAIRU as regional  markets 
become more nearly  alike. As noted earlier,  there is no immutable  law 
setting  the NAIRU above the level achieved in the 1960s. 
Institutional  Changes in the Response of Wages 
While regional  diversity may be one way in which the 1980s differ 
from  the 1960s,  other  institutional  changes  have occurred  that  may have 
more  important  and lasting  effects on labor  market  behavior.  In partic- 
ular,  the erosion  of the big firm,  big union, Galbraithian  economy of the 
mid-1960s  has quickened the reaction of wages to a tightening  labor 
market, with possibly far-reaching  implications for the inflationary 
behavior  of the economy. 
Economic  Debate  in the 1960s 
The Keynesian  economists in the Kennedy-Johnson  administrations 
arrived  in Washington  committed  to reducing  unemployment  and stim- 
ulating  economic growth. However, they were confronted  by structur- 
alists  arguing  that  unemployment  could not be much  reduced  because of 
worsening  mismatches  in labor demand  and supply. The structuralist 
argument  ran  across the political  spectrum.  Liberals,  including  some in 
the Department  of Labor, used it to justify federal expenditures on 
"manpower"  programs  and aid to education. Conservatives  used it to 
argue  against  Keynesian  demand-stimulus  remedies-an argument  heard 
within  policy circles of the Federal  Reserve Board  and expressed in the 
unpublished  minutes  of the Federal  Open  Market  Committee.20 
In its first Economic Report of the President,  the Kennedy adminis- 
20. I obtained  microfilms  containing  minutes  of the Federal Reserve Open Market 
Committee.  These  minutes  are  more  detailed  than  those  officially  published  by the Federal 
Reserve  and  indicate  the opinions  of specific  members.  For an example  of an expression 
of the  structuralist  view at the FOMC,  see the minutes  of January  1, 1964,  microfilm  M591, 
reel  23,  National  Archives,  statement  of member  Hayes:  "Certainly  there  is nojustification 
in keeping  it [monetary  expansion]  up in order  to cope with an unemployment  problem 
which  is in large  part  structural...." 206  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
tration  set a 4 percent "interim"  target  for unemployment  and argued 
that structural  unemployment  lay below this target. The possibility of 
achieving  the target  by mid-1963  was discussed. Use of the adjective 
"interim"  stemmed  from  a belief by some of the new economists that a 
rate even below 4 percent was in fact sustainable.  Yet the Council of 
Economic Advisers was clearly concerned about possible inflation  as 
the unemployment  target  was approached.  The concern was based not 
on fears  of a generalized  labor  shortage  but  rather  on a bargaining  theory 
of wage setting  and  an oligopolistic  view of price setting. 
Specifically,  as the economy expanded, it was considered possible 
that unions might demand large wage increases or that oligopolist 
industries  might  push up prices before the target was achieved, thus 
thwarting  the unemployment  goal. To combat these potential  develop- 
ments, the Report proposed wage-price guideposts, tying suggested 
wage settlements  to trend growth in productivity  and price setting to 
cost markups.  Later, the wage target  was explicitly set at 3.2 percent. 
When  the economy achieved 5 percent unemployment  by the end of 
1964  without  substantial  inflation,  the CEA argued  that there were still 
ample  supplies  of labor  available  to permit  a noninflationary  lowering  of 
unemployment. 
The contrary  structuralist  view had several elements. Generally,  the 
argument  was that demand in the labor market had shifted toward 
educated,  skilled  labor,  but  supply  had  not  followed suit. In short  supply 
were scientists, engineers, and technicians;  in excess supply were the 
unskilled  who might  once have been picked up in blue-collar  manufac- 
turing  jobs. This analysis was based in part on data on shifts in the 
occupational  and industrial  mix in the 1950s.  The view was reinforced 
by numerous  projections  by Labor  Department  officials  and  from  Labor 
Department  documents aimed at high school guidance counselors. It 
was linked to the fear that computerization  would lead to massive 
displacement  of industrial  workers.21  CEA  economists, however, attrib- 
uted the sluggishness  of job opportunities  in unskilled  and semi-skilled 
blue-collarjobs  in the late 1950s  to a soft economy;jobs at the lower end 
of the skill range would expand if aggregate demand were boosted. 
Keynesians  outside  the administration  generally  shared  the CEA view. 
21. The Labor  Department  did not officially  support  the structuralist  position.  But its 
documents  emphasized  that  job expansion  would be faster than  average  in professional, 
technical,  and  skilled  fields.  See U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1963);  Diebold  (1962). Daniel  J. B. Mitchell  207 
There  were other  influences  contributing  to the power  of the structur- 
alist approach,  apart  from past labor  force trends. In a vague way, the 
structuralist  view was combined  with the notion that the United States 
should somehow  produce  more scientific  personnel  in order  to keep up 
with the Russians. It was the converse of the current  notion that the 
United States should  turn  out fewer lawyers  to emulate  the Japanese. 
The CEA, anxious  to combat  the idea that structural  unemployment 
had  invisibly  crept  up in the 1950s,  undertook  studies  to refute  the view 
that it had. In retrospect, it appears that at least some of the fall in 
unemployment  after 1964  can be attributed  to such structuralist  factors 
as the increased  military  draft  and enrollments  in manpower  programs. 
However, removing  the absolute  (as opposed to incremental)  influence 
of the draft  and manpower  programs  from 1964  in fact suggests that the 
labor  market  was even tighter  that  year  than  in 1988  than  the comparison 
of overall unemployment  rates reveals. That is, in structuralist  terms, 
the quiescence  of wages in 1964  becomes all the more  a mystery. 
Although  policymakers  at the Federal Reserve were more likely to 
accept the structuralist  view of unemployment  than that of the more 
optimistic Keynesians at the CEA, both the CEA and the Federal 
Reserve shared one view: the importance of following union wage 
settlements  as guides to future inflation.  The CEA's guideposts inher- 
ently were union-focused  since union  wage decisions were more  visible 
and publicized than nonunion counterparts.  At the Federal Reserve, 
members of the Open Market Committee took note of major union 
settlements, such as the auto settlement of 1964, as possible pattern 
setters  for other  wages. 
Thus, when the auto settlements provided no first-year  basic wage 
increase, it was seen as a sign that the inflation  threshold  had not been 
crossed.  The auto  contracts  seemed  to continue  the pattern  of zero basic 
wage adjustments  seen in the much-watched  steel contracts  in 1962  and 
1963,  although  observers  noted that  the nonwage  elements appeared  to 
exceed significantly  the 3.2 percent  guideposts. By late 1964,  however, 
signs of discontent  among  union workers could be seen. Observers  of 
the industrial  relations  scene (correctly)  predicted  the electoral ouster 
of the president  of the steelworkers'  union,  who was identified  with zero 
wage settlements  and moves toward  labor-management  cooperation.22 
22. Fogel  and  Meyers  (1964). 208  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1989 
And, indeed, the 1965 steel settlement ended the zero pattern. Strike 
activity increased, and strikes were increasingly  centered on general 
wage adjustments. 
The Changing Importance  of the  Union Sector 
It is not difficult  to understand  why union  settlements  were so closely 
watched  in the early to mid-1960s.  As table 6 indicates, union workers 
represented  a much larger  fraction  of the overall work force then than 
they do now. Sluggish economic conditions, especially in the union 
sector,  produced  minor  membership  losses in  the  early  1960s,  but  nothing 
like the large drops seen in the 1980s. Although  precise data are not 
available,  about  6 out of 10  union  workers  were  under  contracts  covering 
1,000  or more workers.23  Econometric  evidence developed in the early 
1960s was viewed as confirming  the pattern-setting  influence of key 
contracts  that  had  been widely asserted  by industrial  relations  experts.24 
Perhaps  more significant  than the number  of union workers is the 
proportion  of labor  compensation  that  was union-negotiated.  Union  pay 
is higher  than  nonunion,  and union  workers  work longer  weekly hours. 
Thus,  the importance  of union  pay  is understated  by employment  counts. 
As the informal  table below indicates, a 1 percent increase in union 
wages in the early 1960s  was sufficient  to raise aggregate  compensation 
0.4 percent, apart  from  any pattern-setting  influence  on nonunion  work- 
ers. In contrast,  the figure  for the late 1980s  was about  0.2 percent.25 
1958-  1963-  1968-  1978-  1983-  1988 
1959  1964  1969  1979  1984 
Union sector  compensation 
as proportion  of total 
private  compensation  44  39  37  31  25  21 
23. The BLS did not begin  estimating  the proportion  under  such contracts  until 1967 
and  the estimate  jumped  markedly  in 1968,  partly  because  of employment  growth  but  also 
probably  because  of more  complete  data.  In 1968,  the number  of workers  estimated  to be 
under  major  private  contracts  was 10.4  million,  over 60 percent  of estimated  private  union 
membership  in that year. See Ward  and Davis (1968, p. 20); Troy and Sheflin  (1985, p. 
A2). 
24. Eckstein  and  Wilson  (1962). 
25. Technical  details underlying  the calculations  used to obtain  the estimates  in the 
informal  table  can be found  in Jacoby  and  Mitchell  (1988).  The 1988  estimate  in the table Daniel J. B. Mitchell  209 
Table 6.  Trends in Private Sector Union Representation, 1959-88,  Selected Yearsa 
Major  union 
Union  Union  representation 
representation  representation  as percentage 
density  workers  of all union 
Year  (percent)  (millions)  representation 
1959  32  14.6  ... 
1964  31  15.1 
1969  29  16.9  ... 
1980  22  15.5  60 
1988  14  11.8  52 
Source:  Data  for  1959-69  from Troy  and  Sheflin  (1985,  pp.  A1-A2).  Data  for  1980-88  from  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics (1981, p. 28) and Mitchell (1989b, p. 495). 
a.  1980 figures for total  representation  refer to May.  Major union representation  (agreements  covering  1,000 or 
more workers) is as of October for 1980 and September for  1988. 
Big Firms and the Administered  Sector 
The discrepancy  between the 1960s  and 1980s  is especially marked 
with  regard  to trends  in firm  size and  trends  in employing  units. As table 
7 shows, the Fortune 500, the archetypal  Galbraithian  firms, grew in 
employment  at a faster clip than  the overall  economy during  the 1960s. 
But  in the 1980s,  employment  at the Fortune  500  shrank  absolutely  even 
as total employment  elsewhere  expanded. 
Similar  trends are evident from County  Business Patterns data; as 
table 8 shows, larger  employing  units grew more rapidly  than others in 
the 1960s,  but  contracted  in the 1980s.  Moreover,  this tendency  was not 
simply  a reflection  of the relative  growth  of manufacturing  and  services. 
As the table  shows, the same  trends  are  observed  within  manufacturing. 
Employment  trends  in the  union  sector  (table  6) show that  workers  under 
major  contracts  (those  covering  1,000  or more  employees)  have declined 
relative to total union employment, mirroring  the move to  smaller 
is an extrapolation  based  on unionization  in that  year  of the data  described  in the Jacoby- 
Mitchell  paper. However, the estimation  technique  used to adjust  the data for fringe 
benefits  is probably  upward  biased and the figures  may be off by 1-2 percentage  points. 
According  to unpublished  data  from the BLS, for the private  employment  cost index in 
December  1988, the union weight was 24.6 percent. However, the ECI methodology 
overstates  union  importance  during  periods  of union  decline.  The 1988  weights  are based 
on employment  counts  as of 1980,  not 1988,  adjusted  for  changes  in the  union  and  nonunion 
pay trends.  Thus,  the weights  do not take account  of the big decline  in unionization  after 
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Table 7.  Employment Trends, Fortune 500 and Private Nonagricultural Sector, 
1960-88,  Selected Years 
Millions 
Private 
Fortune  500  nonagricultural 
Year  (millions)  (millions) 
1960  9.2  45.8 
1964  10.5  48.7 
1969  14.8  58.2 
Annual  percent  change, 1960-69  5.5  2.7 
1979  14.8  73.9 
1988  12.7  88.7 
Annual  percent  change, 1979-88  -  1.7  2.0 
Source:  "The Fortune 500,"  Fortutne, annual April issue,  various years.  Employnment  and Earnings (March 1989), 
table B. 1. 
business units.26  Although  the existence of the trend  is more important 
for  current  purposes  than  the  cause, it  is worth  noting  that  some  observers 
attribute  the move in the 1980s  to smaller  units  as technologically  driven 
and  likely to continue.27 
While industrial  mix does not explain the shrinkage  of employing 
units, it does reinforce  it. The informal  table  below shows the percentage 
of employees  in what  might  be loosely called  the "administered"  sector: 
mining,  manufacturing,  transportation,  and  public  utilities. 
1959  1964  1969  1979  1988 
Administrative  sector as percent 
of total private nonagricultural  employment  47  45  43  37  29 
This sector accounted  for 45 percent of employment  in the mid-1960s; 
by the late 1980s  it accounted for less than 30 percent and less than a 
26. Comparable  data  are  not available  for the 1960s.  The BLS did  conduct  a survey  of 
wage  developments  in manufacturing  during  that  period.  Based  on data  from  that  survey, 
it appears  that the proportion  of workers  in manufacturing  under  major  agreements  fell 
from  62 percent  to 57 percent  during  1959-69.  It is quite  possible,  however,  that  growth  of 
smaller  units  was exaggerated  during  this  period  as the BLS identified  more  small  units  for 
the survey  pool as it continued  to undertake  the survey. (Larger  units would have been 
easier  to identify  and  thus  the survey  would  have  been more  complete  from  the beginning 
in the major  sector.)  Data  for manufacturing  for 1980-88  on a basis comparable  to table  6 
indicate  a drop  in the proportion  of union  workers  covered  by major  agreements  from  56 
percent  to 43 percent. 
27. Piore  and  Sabel  (1984). Daniel J. B. Mitchell  211 
Table 8.  Employment Trends by Size of Establishment, 1962-69  and 1979-86 
Annual percent change 
Number  of employees 
Years  1-99  100-499  500 or more  500-999  1,000 or more 
1962-69 
All  3.2  4.3  4.4  ...  ... 
Manufacturing  1.4  3.4  3.7  ... 
1979-86 
All  2.1  2.1  ...  0.0  -0.3 
Manufacturing  -0.1  -  1.2  . ..  -2.6  -  3.1 
Source: County Business  Patterns,  U.S.  Sutnmary, 1964, 1969, and 1986, table lB.  1962-69 data refer to "reporting 
units."  1979-86 data refer to establishments. 
fourth  if transportation  and  utilities  are  dropped  from  the sector  because 
of deregulation. 
Changes  in the industry  mix of employment  can affect average pay 
rates  by pushing  employment  toward  or  away  from  higher-wage  employ- 
ers. Comparison  of the BLS data on average hourly earnings and its 
hourly earnings index (which standardizes  for industry composition) 
suggests  that during  1979-88  the industry  mix effect reduced  wages 1.8 
percent for production  and nonsupervisory  workers. In contrast, the 
industry  mix effect slightly  raised  average  pay during  the 1960s  for this 
group.28 
The BLS now publishes  an index as a component  of the employment 
cost index  for production  and nonsupervisory  workers  that corrects  for 
both industry  and occupational  mix. A comparison  of the occupation- 
industry  corrected index with the industry-corrected  hourly earnings 
index permits an estimate of the occupation effect. The comparison 
suggests that changes in occupational composition reduced pay 5.1 
percent  during  1979-88.  Thus, during  the 1980s  employment  was being 
shifted  toward  lower-wage  employers  and  lower-wage  jobs, that  is, jobs 
least likely  to be cushioned  from  labor  market  forces by union  contracts 
and  bureaucratic  personnel  practices. 
In short,  the big firm,  big union, administered  sector of employment, 
no matter  how defined,  was considerably  larger  and more important  in 
28. The hourly  earnings  index (which  was discontinued  after 1988)  was standardized 
for industry  mix and overtime  in manufacturing.  It did not correct  for overtime  in other 
industries,  causing  some  unknown  error  to enter  into  the comparisons  in the text. 212  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
the setting  of prices  and  wages in the 1960s  than  it was by the late 1980s. 
There was scope for a transitory  reduction of wage premiums  in the 
1960s  economy as demand  rose. Big unions  were adversely  affected by 
the  downward  shift  in  wage  norms  in the early 1960s;  long-term  contracts 
(by then common)  further  slowed the union  response  as unemployment 
fell. Reinforcing  this structural  difference  was the existence of the wage- 
price  guideposts  program,  which could put downward  pressure  on key, 
that is, big and visible, players. At least on the wage side, observers  of 
the period  found  evidence of such an inflation-retarding  effect.29 
Inflation Expectations:  Then and Now 
The inflation  experience  of the work  force in the early 1960s  was quite 
different  from  that of the current  work force. In 1962,  for example, the 
median  age of the work force was more than 40, that is, old enough  for 
more than half the work force to remember  the deflation  of the Great 
Depression.  In the mid-1980s,  in contrast,  the median  age was about  35; 
most of the work  force had  no experience  with sustained  price  deflation. 
Good  data  on inflation  expectations  for the general  population  are  not 
available. However, data from the University of Michigan's Survey 
Research  Center  suggest  that  during  the early 1960s,  about  30  percent  of 
the household  respondents  surveyed  expected prices would either stay 
the same  or fall in the year  ahead.  This proportion  had  dropped  to about 
a fourth  by early 1964.  There  had not actually  been a single year of CPI 
decline or constancy since 1955. But the notion that prices might be 
stable or declining  provided  a stabilizing  anti-inflation  anchor. Indeed, 
the fact that the Survey Research Center would ask questions about 
inflation  not in terms of what rate to expect but whether  prices would 
rise, fall, or stay the same is itself revealing. 
The Livingston  survey provides an indication  of the inflation  expec- 
tations  of economic forecasters, which may not be accurate  reflections 
of what wage setters were thinking.  These data suggest a backward- 
looking, moving-average  process of expectations. In 1964,  forecasters 
expected  annual  rates  of inflation  of 1.2  percent;  in 1988,  they anticipated 
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4.9 percent.30  A similar  picture  emerges  from examination  of long-term 
bond  yields. 
It can be argued  that  inflation  expectations  matter  a lot for wages set 
under  long-term  contracts  but not so much for wages set in something 
closer to a spot market.  In that case, low expectations  of inflation  may 
have had more of a dampening  effect on wage setting in the mid-1960s 
than similar  expectations would have on current  wage determination. 
Indeed, there is evidence from  recent surveys of wage-change  expecta- 
tions  that  these expectations  play  little  independent  role  in  contemporary 
wage setting. 
A number  of management  consulting  firms  and other organizations 
now conduct surveys of white-collar  (and therefore  largely nonunion) 
wage setting. Since 1983, Charles Peck of the Conference Board has 
collected these surveys in a feature appearing  in the Board's annual 
HumanResource  Outlookpublication.31  Mostof the surveys  break  down 
the white-collar  work  force into executives, salary-exempt,  and salary- 
nonexempt  employees. The reports  indicate  average  predicted  percen- 
tage  salary  adjustments  by worker  classification  for  the  next  year  (PRED) 
recounted  by respondents  for their own organizations.  Also reported 
are the average  actual salary adjustments  in the current  year (ACT).32 
By following  the reports,  it is possible to determine  how accurately  the 
previously  projected  increases  determined  subsequent  actual  outcomes 
for each worker  classification  in each survey. A total of 92 observations 
reported  during  1984-89  were available.33 
30. Unpublished  Livingston  survey data  were kindly  provided  by John  M. Tynan  of 
the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Philadelphia. 
31. The reports  were originally  titled Labor Outlook.  I wish to thank  Mr. Peck and 
Elizabeth  R. Arreglado  of the Conference  Board  for supplying  me with  data. 
32. The reports  are typically  published  on the basis of increased  salary  budgets  per 
employee.  Because  of peculiarities  (and  confusion)  in the human  resource  field  about  the 
proper accounting of merit increases for current employees, these reports tend to 
exaggerate  actual average pay increases by  1-2 percentage points. Essentially, the 
projections  include  the  gross  cost of merit  increases  without  an  offset  for  the salary  savings 
that  occur  as senior  workers  leave and  lower-paid  new hires  replace  them.  For  details,  see 
Mitchell  (1989a,  pp. 93-97). 
33. Included  in the Peck reports were surveys by the American Compensation 
Association,  the Conference  Board, Executive Compensation  Service (Wyatt),  Handy, 
Hansen,  Hay, Hewitt,  Mercer,  Sibson,  and  TPF&C.  Not all were present  in each year. At 
the time  this paper  was written,  only data  from  the Conference  Board  were available  for 
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Regression  analysis  based on these data suggests that compensation 
managers make their predictions about next year's pay adjustment 
largely  on the basis  of past  pay change  in their  firm  and  in  the surrounding 
economy together  with anticipated  changes  in labor  market  conditions. 
Specifically: 
PREDforO  =  0.64  + 0.76ACT_,  + 0.26ECI_  -  0.07U_ 
(0.16)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
R2=  0.94, 
where  PRED refers  to the prediction  made  for year  0 in year -  1, ECI is 
the percent  change  in the employment  cost index  for  private  white-collar 
workers, U is the June unemployment  rate, and standard  errors are 
shown below the coefficients.34  The predictions, however, are not 
statistically  significant  as forecasters  of actual  salary  outcomes. That  is: 
ACTo =  1.21 +  0.29PREDforo +  0.56ACT1 
(0.27)  (0.18)  (0.14) 
+  0.28ECIL1  -  0.18Uo  -  0.08U-1 
(0.06)  (0.07)  (0.04) 
R2=  0.83, 
where all coefficients are significant  except that of PRED.  In short, it 
appears  that although  compensation  managers  made predictions  about 
wage inflation  in the 1980s, their anticipations  did not seem to matter. 
What did matter  was an update on the information  the managers  had 
about  labor  market  conditions. 
In summary,  in the 1960s-a period  in which  a larger  fraction  of wages 
was set under  long-term  contracts,  was influenced  by such contracts,  or 
was set in a contract-like  process-prevailing  inflation expectations 
probably  helped to dampen  wage changes initially  as the labor market 
34. The June date for U was used because it approximates  the period  in which the 
surveys  are taken.  ECI  refers  to total  compensation  on a fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter 
basis. It should be noted that ACT is not a final measure  of actual pay but rather  the 
respondents'  statement  of what  the planned  increase  for the current  year  is. Experiments 
to determine  whether  in making  predictions  respondents  projected  future  unemployment 
rates  produced  anomalous  results. Specifically,  the actual  value of U in the equation  for 
PRED, that is, the year-ahead  actual unemployment  rate that respondents  might be 
rationally  predicting,  entered  with  a significant  positive  sign. Peculiarities  in the relatively 
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tightened. During  the 1980s, wage setters had higher expectations of 
inflation  than  they did in the 1960s,  but  these expectations  probably  had 
less importance,  since most wages were being set outside a long-term 
contract  framework. 
Changes in the Employer-Employee  Relationship 
The  argument  being  made  here  is not  that  the labor  market  has  become 
an  auction-style  spot  market  but  rather  that  it has  shifted  along  a spectrum 
in that direction.  Thus, relative to the 1960s  there are less likely to be 
lags  in response  to demand  pressures.  Employers  will raise  wages if they 
have to for retention  and recruitment.  During  the first  half of 1989,  for 
example, Federal Reserve policies aimed at slowing the economy did 
succeed in halting  the previous  acceleration  of wage inflation. 
There  is still lethargy  in wage setting, as the coefficient  on ACT_  l  as 
a determinant  of ACTo suggests. But institutional  changes suggest that 
the lethargy  is likely to be less of a factor in the future  than  it was in the 
past. These changes involve not only the shrinkage  of the union and 
large  firm  sectors, but  also shifts  in the employer-employee  relationship. 
Employment Tenure 
It is ironic  thatjust  as economists  began  to detect and  rationalize  long- 
term employment tenures, actual tenure began to decline. Table 9 
summarizes  available  time series data on median  job tenure. It might 
have  been  expected  that  as young  baby  boomers  entered  the  labor  market 
in the 1960s  and 1970s, median  tenure would decline. However, such 
demographically  determined  tenure  changes  should  have reversed  in the 
1980s. 
Unfortunately,  BLS broke  the series in 1983  by changing  the question 
from job tenure to employer tenure.35  But the fact that tenure fell 
according  to the new series from 1983  to 1987  suggests that the secular 
trend  seen in the old series is continuing.  Table 10  shows that  tenure  fell 
in all age classes except 35-44 (where  the boomers  are aging). 
35. Job tenure  will be shorter  than employer  tenure  since a worker  can change  jobs 
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Table  9. Job Tenure  Trends,  1963-87, Selected  Years 
Median  years of tenure 
Series and year  All  Males  Females 
New series 
1987  4.2  5.0  3.6 
1983  4.4  5.1  3.7 
Old series 
1981  3.2  4.0  2.5 
1978  3.6  4.5  2.6 
1973  3.9  4.6  2.8 
1968  3.8  4.8  2.4 
1966  4.2  5.2  2.8 
1963  4.6  5.7  3.0 
Sources:  Hamel (1963, 1967); Sekscenski  (1979); Horvath (1982); Sehgal (1984). 
Some of the fall  in tenure  may  be due to the decline  in the union  sector 
of the work force, where longer-than-average  tenures are found. Some 
may be due to the decline in employment  at large  firms  and to industrial 
restructuring.  The financial  approach  to enterprise  control, that is, the 
view of the firm  as a portfolio  of detachable  and mergeable  assets, and 
the related increased pace of mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures, 
tends to undermine  stable employment  policies. It is difficult  for em- 
ployees to have a relationship  with an employer whose identity keeps 
changing. 
Contingent  Workers 
There have been increasing  reports of expanded use of contingent 
workers  by U.S. firms  in the 1980s. The definition  of "contingent" is 
imprecise;  commentators  seem to mean employees who do not have 
"regular"  jobs with  their  employers  but  are  instead  hired  on a temporary 
basis with  fewer entitlements,  especially  to benefit  plans. However, the 
concept is sometimes  expanded  to include  employees hired  by smaller 
subcontractors  (who  handle  peak  work  for  other  firms)  and  self-employed 
workers.  Employers  are  seen as having  fewer  obligations  to such  workers 
and  as hiring  them  essentially  in a spot market. 
Richard  Belous, for example,  put the contingent  work  force between 
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Table 10.  Job Tenure Trends, 1983-87,  by Age Group 
Median  years  Percent with tenure 
of tenure  of 20 years or more 
Age group  1983  1987  1983  1987 
All  4.4  4.2  9.9  9.3 
16 -  24 years  1.5  1.2 
25-34  years  3.5  3.4  0.1  O.Oa 
35-44  years  5.8  6.1  5.0  5.2 
45-54  years  10.2  9.6  23.4  22.7 
55-64  years  13.6  12.7  34.8  33.7 
65 and over  13.2  12.4  38.1  38.1 
Source: Sehgal (1984, p.  19); Daily Labor Report,  October 23,  1987, p. B4. Data as of January. 
a.  Less  than 0.05. 
between  29.9  percent  and  36.6  percent  in 1988.36  His upper-limit  estimate 
includes workers supplied by temporary  help agencies, part-timers, 
workers  in the business  service sector, and  the self-employed.  There  are 
obvious problems  with such a definition,  especially with regard  to the 
inclusion of business services and the self-employed. His lower-limit 
estimate excludes business services and agency temporaries,  but still 
includes  the self-employed. 
An alternative  definition  counting  only agency temporaries  and  part- 
timers  would put the estimates at 17 percent in 1980  and 21 percent in 
1988.  The difficulty  is that existing  labor  market  data  do not pick up the 
degree  of employer  commitment  to the employee. Some part-timers,  for 
example, may be longstanding  employees while others are hired on a 
contingent  basis. Many  employers  appear  to have internal  mechanisms 
for hiring  temporaries;  not all temps are hired through  agencies. And 
temporary  employees often work  full time. 
Because  of the  growing  interest  in  the  contingent  worker  phenomenon, 
several  surveys  have been taken  of its use. A Bureau  of National  Affairs 
report, for example, found that 81 percent of responding  companies 
reported  some  use of part-timers,  59  percent  hired  their  own  temporaries, 
84 percent  hired  temporaries  through  outside agencies, and 57 percent 
used  subcontracting.37  Katharine  Abraham's  nonrandom  survey  of BNA 
respondents  in 1985,  however,  found  a major  gap  between  usage and  the 
36. Belous  (1989,  p. 16). 
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proportion  of work time actually  performed  by contingents  (defined  as 
agency temps, short-term  hires, and on-call workers).38  Such workers 
accounted  for only 1.5 percent of work time, although  the distribution 
was skewed, with some firms  reporting  substantially  heavier  usage. Not 
surprisingly,  these heavy users were firms facing significant  demand 
variability.  Thus, it might be expected that if the proportion  of firms 
facing  demand  uncertainty  increases  over time, use of contingent  work- 
ers will also increase. 
It is difficult  to find  useful time series on the contingent  phenomenon. 
A 1987  BLS survey  of selected distressed  industries  found  that  their  use 
of subcontracting  has been increasing. Larger  firms seemed to make 
more  use of flexible  practices  than  small,  suggesting  that  such  firms  were 
compensating  for rigid  practices  for incumbent  workers  by flexibility  on 
the margin.39  Employment  through  temporary  agencies has expanded 
rapidly  since the 1982  recession trough  but still accounts  for less than  2 
percent of the work force. Initially, the employer motivation  in using 
such services was probably to avoid making  job commitments  after 
having gone through a period of retrenchment. By the late  1980s, 
however, the agencies were being used as de facto recruitment  tools in 
situations where clerical or other types of employees were in short 
supply. 
Despite the lack of good data, it is likely that  the fraction  of the work 
force  hired  on a short-term,  temporary,  or contingent  basis  has  increased 
in the 1980s.  The magnitude  of the contingent  phenomenon,  however, 
may not be accurately  measured  in recent  reports.  Part-time  work  is the 
only continuous  proxy  for contingency  available  with a long time series. 
In 1964,  the proportion  of nonagricultural  part-time  employees was 14 
percent; by  1988 it had reached 18 percent, an increase but not a 
revolution. 
Contingent Pay 
It may well be that  employment  contingency  is itself a symptom  for a 
reduced  sense of employer  obligation  to stabilize  incomes for the work 
force as a whole, including regular workers. In theory, the rise of 
38. Abraham  (1988). 
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contingent workers could be a way of protecting core incumbents. 
However, there  is evidence, again  loose evidence, that  the incidence  of 
contingent  pay systems for incumbents,  such as profit  sharing,  has been 
increasing.40  The BLS estimates  that 21 percent  of full-time  employees 
in medium-to-large  firms  had profit  sharing  in 1988,  although,  unfortu- 
nately, a long-term  time series is not available  for this estimate.41 
Within  the  union  sector  during  the 1980s,  the  use of lump-sum  bonuses 
became  widespread  as an alternative  to wage increases. In late 1988,  51 
percent of workers  under  major  private, nonconstruction  union agree- 
ments had lump sums in their contracts, compared  with 48 percent in 
1987.  Such  bonuses  hardly  existed before  the early 1980s.42  The bonuses 
most commonly are paid as flat dollar amounts and are commonly 
concentrated  in the first year of the contract. The average flat dollar 
amount  negotiated  in 1988  was $848, according  to one survey, perhaps 
3-4 percent  of a typical  private  union  worker's  pay. Percentage-denom- 
inated  bonuses  also fell into that  range.43  Lump  sums  are  now often used 
in contracts  where no first-year  wage increase is specified,  but are also 
common  in contracts  in which the wage is raised. 
Typically, lump sums provide some direct saving to the employer 
because certain  fringe  benefits  are geared  to the wage (exclusive of the 
bonus). In addition,  workers  hired  after the effective date of the bonus 
do not receive it. Thus, a 3 percent  bonus costs less in the year in which 
it is effective than a 3 percent wage increase. However, there may be 
more  to the growth  of the bonuses than  simple  cost savings. 
There  is evidence that  the norms  of the labor  market  make  it easier  to 
reduce elements of compensation  labeled bonuses than those labeled 
40. Mitchell,  Lewin, and Lawler  (1990).  It is unclear  whether  the proportion  of firms 
offering  profit  sharing  has notably  changed.  What  matters,  however, is the proportion  of 
employees  covered. At one time, profit  sharing  was viewed as mainly  a benefit  plan  for 
managers  and-where the benefit  was more  widely  spread-mainly for smaller  firms.  The 
surveys  of the U.S. Chamber  of Commerce  do not  show  dramatic  changes  in  the  proportion 
of firms  with profit  sharing,  but these surveys  do not report  the proportion  of employees 
covered. 
41. BLS (1989a,  p. 138). 
42. For that  reason, data on lump  sums prior  to the mid-1980s  are nonexistent.  The 
text  figures  come  from  the  January  1988  and 1989  issues of the  Monthly Labor Review, pp. 
16  and 13,  respectively.  Construction  workers  are omitted  since they typically  have only 
casual  relationships  with  employers,  and  lump  sums  are  therefore  not practical.  (No lump 
sums  were  reported  for construction  in either  year.) 
43. Bureau  of National  Affairs  (1989). 220  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1989 
wages.44  Thus, it is possible that over several rounds  of bargaining,  the 
bonus  element  might  prove  to be more  variable  than  the wage, that  is, to 
be an ersatz profit-sharing  plan like that some observers find in the 
Japanese  system of bonus payments.45  Recent evidence suggests that 
demand  uncertainty  (proxied  by a shock prior  to negotiations)  increases 
the probability  that  a lump-sum  union  contract  will be negotiated.46 
It is important  to  note that spread over all workers (union and 
nonunion),  lump  sums appear  to be a relatively  minor  element  of pay at 
present. They are probably  concentrated  in the union sector, which is 
now a small  part  of the private  economy. (Data  on nonunion  lump  sums 
are  not  available  or are  likely  to be confounded  with other  kinds  of bonus 
plans.)  BLS estimates  of the proportion  of pay going  to "nonproduction 
bonuses" came to only 0.8 percent  of compensation  as of early 1989.47 
Phenomena  such as contingent  workers and contingent  pay suggest 
that  employers  may  be pulling  away  from  long-term  commitments  to  job 
and  income stability.  The observable  parts  of these phenomena  may be 
the  tip  of a much  larger  iceberg.  If so, data  on the  proportion  of contingent 
workers  in the labor  force or the proportion  of compensation  in contin- 
gent pay understate  changes that have occurred  in wage setting. Thus, 
the kind  of wage stickiness  in response  to demand  associated  with long- 
term  relationships  is likely to have been, and to be, reduced. 
Responsiveness  of Competitive  Wages 
Is it in fact the case that more competitively  determined  wages will 
be more  responsive  to demand  fluctuations?  There  is evidence  that  union 
wages  in the mid-  1960s  responded  more  slowly than  nonunion  as demand 
and  price  inflation  accelerated.48  Table 1 indicates  a widening  of the gap 
between  the all-sector  hourly  earnings  index  and  union  wage  adjustments 
after 1965. Beyond that, within manufacturing,  if smallness of size is 
taken as a proxy for competitiveness, it appears  that in the mid-1960s 
wages moved up faster  in smaller  establishments. 
44. Kahneman,  Knetsch,  and  Thaler  (1986). 
45. Freeman  and  Weitzman  (1987). 
46. Erickson  and  Ichino  (1989). 
47. U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  press release USDL: 89-295,  June 15, 1989.  The 
author confirmed  with BLS that lump sums are annualized  in the survey to avoid 
understatement  of their  yearly  magnitude. 
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Table 11.  Manufacturing Wage Change by Size of Employing Unit,  1963-67 
Percent 
Employees  in reporting unit 
Item  1-99  100-249  250-499  500-999  1,000-2,499  2,500 or more 
Annual  change  in payroll 
per employee  4.8  3.8  3.5  3.2  2.8  3.1 
Annual  change  in 
employment  0.4  3.0  3.9  4.0  4.3  5.8 
Source:  Bureau  of the Census  (1967),  table 1. 
Table 11  provides  data from the Census of Manufactures  on payroll 
per employee during 1963-67. (Unfortunately,  comparable  data were 
not  available  for  other  sectors  from  business  censuses, nor  for  the 1980s.) 
It  appears  from  the  table  that  larger  establishments,  with  their  preexisting 
wage  premiums,  were able  to add  workers  as demand  expanded.  Smaller 
establishments  had to boost wages competitively  in response. If in the 
late 1980s  competitive pressures are more widely spread  among busi- 
nesses, the pattern  of wage sensitivity  observed in the 1960s  for smaller 
units  may  well be more  uniform  across size classes. 
Labor Shortages 
Certainly,  evidence that employers are having difficulty recruiting 
new employees would be a harbinger  of wage inflation  to come. What 
does an economy with recruitment  problems look like? Again, the 
experience  of the 1960s  is enlightening.  Examination  of articles in the 
popular  and trade  press and in official sources of that era reveals the 
following  pattern. 
Official Reports 
Official sources, such as reports from the Employment Service, 
described  shortages  of personnel  in specific  occupations  throughout  the 
early 1960s,  especially health care workers, scientists, and engineers. 
Certain  skilled  blue-collar  workers  were also said to be in short supply. 
Similar views appear in the annual Manpower Report of the President, 
which generally  devoted far more attention  to labor surpluses  than to 
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The 1965  Report (largely  written, it may be presumed, in late 1964 
and early 1965)  included  extensive discussion on health, science, and 
other professional  personnel for which labor market pressures were 
apparently  being felt. Thus, the period surrounding  the writing  of the 
report  emerges  as one of transition,  balanced  between labor shortages 
in selected fields and labor surpluses  elsewhere. By 1966, with unem- 
ployment below 4 percent, the tone of the Report changed; brave 
assertions  were made that government  manpower  programs  would be 
available  to deal with the growing  tautness  of the labor  market.49 
Studies of labor market pressures, issued regularly  by the Labor 
Department  by order  of the president  beginning  in 1966,  acknowledged 
"imbalances" but argued that real shortages would not exist until 
unemployment  fell to the extremely low levels seen during  the Korean 
War.50  The reasons for this insistence on minimizing  labor market 
pressures  were undoubtedly  partly  political. But the academic  division 
of unemployment  into demand,  structural,  and  frictional  categories  may 
also have played a role. Only when a purely  frictional  element was left 
(a  level identified  with  wartime  conditions)  would  a shortage  be acknowl- 
edged, regardless  of resulting  wage pressures. 
The Popular  and Trade Press 
As might  be expected, the popular  and  trade  press was less restrained 
in its reaction to changing  labor market  conditions.51  In mid-1964,  the 
press still was writing  about automation  and displacement.  But by the 
latter  half of the year, occasional shortage  stories began to appear. "A 
Good  Man  Is Hard  to Find,  " declared  one headline.  By mid-1965,  reports 
appeared  on the virtues of relaxing hiring standards  and considering 
previously  unwanted  job applicants. 
However, the real flood of labor  shortage  articles  began  in late 1965, 
articles whose flavor can easily be sensed from their titles: "Help 
Wanted-Almost Everywhere," "Too Much  Employment?,"  "Skilled 
49.  ManpowerReport  of the President (1966, pp. 31-34). 
50. The Korean  War  comparison  is made  in news release USDL-7299  (July  3, 1966). 
Insistence  that  there  were "imbalances,"  but  not an "overall  labor  shortage,"  appears  in 
release  USDL-7151  (April  8, 1966).  Janet  Norwood,  BLS Commissioner,  kindly  provided 
me with  samples  of these reports. 
51. Many  articles  from  trade  journals  and the popular  press are mentioned  briefly  in 
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Labor  Pinch  Gets Tighter," "Labor  Shortages  Become Acute," "Help 
Wanted-And  Very Badly." Other articles suggested solutions for 
employers  such as obtaining  foreign  labor, stepping  up internal  training 
programs,  or enlarging  job duties of existing  workers. 
Articles  on labor  shortages  in the past few years have not pointed  to 
anything  like the general  demand  pressures  seen beginning  in late 1965. 
Since the mid-1980s, some articles, based mainly on demographic 
projections  of the baby bust, have warned of an impending shortage. 
Others,  reminiscent  of the early 1960s,  complain  of a growing  structural 
mismatch  problem  involving  basic skill and education  deficiencies. Still 
others  argue,  however, that  potential  employees among  current  nonpar- 
ticipants  in the labor  force or in high-unemployment  areas  can move into 
available  jobs.  Employers are being advised to find ways to recruit 
current  nonparticipants.  Surprisingly,  given the interest  in the effects of 
recently  enacted  immigration  controls,  these controls  have not generally 
been referenced  in the shortage  articles. 
Recent shortage  articles  that cite actual  employer  recruitment  prob- 
lems, as opposed to demographic  projections, have been focused on 
problems  in particular  industries, regions, or occupations. They have 
tended to spotlight health care, some parts of retailing, and clerical 
employees in particular  areas. For several years, there have been 
complaints  that  low-wagejobs  in services,  fast  food, and  small  businesses 
generally  are hard  to fill. 
Some of this problem  at the bottom  of the wage scale may be due to 
the  lack  of an  increase  in  the  federal  minimum  wage  after  1981.  Employers 
who were used to queues at the legal wage floor have had to bid for 
employees as the floor fell in relative  terms. However, there have also 
been reports of worker shortages in high-wage settings. McDonnell 
Douglas  was reported  recently  to have imported  certain  skilled  workers 
from  Britain  and  to be making  heavy  use of overtime  to overcome  a labor 
shortage. Boeing in Everett, Washington,  has rented excess workers 
from  a Lockheed  facility  in Marietta,  Georgia. 
The impression  left by the labor shortage  articles is that 1988-89 is 
roughly  equivalent  to late 1964  and early 1965.  That is, a 5-5.5 percent 
unemployment  rate  in the late 1980s  seems equivalent  to a 4.5-5 percent 
unemployment  rate  in  the 1960s,  at least  in  terms  ofjournalistic  response. 
In both cases, spot shortages were reported in selected sectors and 
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But  there  was not wholesale  excess demand  for labor.  The labor  market, 
as described in both cases in the press, seemed very close to, if not 
already at, the point where increasing wage inflation could pose a 
problem. 
Confirming Surveys 
Several  organizations  have begun  to undertake  management  surveys 
of labor shortages. Table 12 reports such a survey conducted by the 
American  Society for Personnel  Administration  in late 1988. As in all 
such surveys, earlier data are not available  for comparison. And the 
results  therefore  tend to be ambiguous.  A tight  labor  market  was clearly 
indicated for the Northeast. Across the country, many respondents 
reported  having  some difficulties  finding  labor.  But many  did not.52 
The ASPA survey broke down the country  into six regions for each 
of the seven occupations  shown in the table. When asked about future 
shortages  relative  to present, in 40 of the 42 region-occupation  pairs  the 
proportion  expecting  future  "great  or  very  great  " difficulties  in  recruiting 
was higher  than  the  proportion  reporting  present  difficulties.  When  asked 
about strategies for recruitment and retention problems, the most 
common  response  was wage increases  (58 percent). 
More  recent data  from an informal  survey undertaken  by the author 
during  June-August 1989 are summarized  in table 13. The survey, of 
members of the American Compensation  Association, was taken by 
telephone rather than by mail to avoid potential selective response 
biases.S3  In loose terms, however, the telephone  survey  paints  a picture 
52. The survey  was taken, by mail, of 4,470  ASPA members.  The response  rate was 
16 percent  (707 usable forms). ASPA membership  is undoubtedly  biased toward  larger 
firms  with  formal  personnel  policies.  (The  survey  did  not ask  for size of firm.)  A previously 
cited survey  of small  manufacturing  firms  by the National  Association  of Manufacturers 
in April-May  1989  suggested  similar  recruiting  results  for skilled  workers,  but less of a 
problem  for clericals  and unskilled  workers.  Questions  were asked about  mid-level  and 
senior  executives,  but  many  firms  responded  that  they did  not have  such  titles. Over  2,200 
firms  responded,  a 25 percent  response  rate. 
53. Mr.  John  Ferrence  of the ACA  kindly  provided  an up-to-date  address  listing.  Two 
research  assistants  called  members  of the ACA (other  than  non-U.S. residents,  manage- 
ment  consultants,  and  individuals  employed  in  public  administration).  They  were  instructed 
to attempt  to reach  the individual  but  if problems  were encountered  in making  contact,  for 
example,  the individual  was on vacation,  simply  to call the next person  on the address  list. 
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Table  12. Results  of ASPA  Labor  Shortages  Mail Survey,  September-October  1988 
Percent 
Employer characterization  of difficulty 
in recruiting 
Not  at  G-reat-very great 
all-very  United 
Occupation  small  Moderate  States  Northeast 
Executive and administrative 
managerial  57  32  11  18 
Sales  56  28  16  12 
Professional  46  29  25  26 
Office  clerical  50  23  27  50 
Unskilled  53  19  28  51 
Technical  and technical  support  34  35  31  35 
Skilled  and crafts  37  27  36  62 
Source: American Society  for Personnel  Administration (1989, pp. 8-15).  See  text for details. 
similar  to that of ASPA. That is, there is a spread of responses in all 
regions, although  the gap between the Northeast and the rest of the 
country  was not statistically  significant.54  But as expected, respondents 
willing  to characterize  the labor  market  as very tight  represent  a smaller 
proportion  of the telephone  survey than  in the potentially  biased ASPA 
mail  survey. 
What  do employers in the late 1980s  who do report  labor shortages 
do in response?  In general  terms, they do what employers  in the 1960s 
did  when  they experienced  what  Arthur  Okun  termed  a "high-pressure" 
economy.55  According  to the results  of the telephone survey, they look 
harder  for workers  (86 percent),  upgrade  existing  workers  (73 percent), 
for mail surveys  to be answered  selectively by individuals  who were having  recruitment 
problems  or who otherwise  had strong  views on the topic and thus had  an interest  in the 
survey. 
54. Answers from manufacturing  respondents  were not significantly  different  from 
those in nonmanufacturing  industries  with regard to perceptions  of labor shortages. 
Similarly,  answers  from  respondents  in the Northeast  were  not significantly  different  from 
those in other  regions.  (A chi-squared  test was used to test for significant  differences.)  It 
might  be noted  that  respondents  sometimes  referred  to conditions  outside  their  geograph- 
ical area, if their firms  had multiple  locations. Thus, the table, which is based on the 
location  of the respondent,  may blur  actual  differences.  However, the softening  of the 
Northeast  labor market  during  the period of the survey (relative  to that of the ASPA 
survey)  may  also have  played  a role in the lack  of a statistically  significant  difference. 
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Table 13e Results of Labor Shortage Telephone Survey, June-August  1989 
Percent 
Employer characterization 
of problem  Duration of problem 
Past few 
Item  None  Limited  General  months  Past  year  Longer 
All regions  44  50  6  17  33  50 
Northeast  40  47  12  9  41  50 
All other  45  50  5  19  31  50 
Excluding  problems 
of more  than  one year  61  34  5  35  65  0 
Manufacturing  50  45  5  18  32  50 
Nonmanufacturing  40  52  7  17  33  50 
Source:  Telephone  survey  by author.  See text for details.  Figures  may not sum to 100  because  of rounding. 
use more  overtime  (40  percent),  or pay bonuses to new hires  (20  percent) 
or to incumbent employees who refer a new hire (40 percent). Pay 
increases (71 percent) are an important  response, but not the only 
response  undertaken. 
The telephone survey makes it possible to remove respondents  who 
report  that  the  recruitment  problems  they  are  experiencing  are  longstand- 
ing. Since there are almost always recruiting  difficulties  in some occu- 
pations (and always chronic complainers), respondents who report 
longstanding  problems may not be typical of those who report more 
recent  demand  pressure.  The  table  shows that  about  half  the respondents 
who do not have chronic  problems  reported  no recruitment  problems  at 
all. This result suggests that if  surveys such as ASPA's excluded 
individuals  who always report  recruitment  problems,  the labor market 
would  appear  less tight  than  their  raw  figures  suggest. 
The Decline of Union Concessions 
In the mid-1980s,  I reported  on the tendency of union concession 
agreements  to spread  from industry  to industry,  despite the economic 
recovery  then  under  way.56  By various  measures,  concession bargaining 
was diminishing  by the late 1980s,  as it had  in the mid-1960s.  That  is, the 
union sector was being affected by the same economic forces as the 
nonunion. 
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Table 14.  Trends in Union Wage Concessions, 1961-69  and 1981-89 
Percent of 
settlements  with 
no  first-year  Severity 
Year  wage increase  indexa 
1961  7  ... 
1962  10  ... 
1963  10  ... 
1964  8  ... 
1965  5 
1966  2  ... 
1967  1 
1968  lb  .  .  . 
1969  0  ... 
1981  2  0.10 
1982  12  0.19 
1983  29  -  0.20 
1984  27  - 0.35 
1985  25  0.12 
1986  37  0.27 
1987  34  0.26 
1988  27  0.47 
1989c  20  0.71 
Source: Daily Labor Report,  various issues;  Mitchell (1989b). 
a.  See  text for definition. 
b.  0-1;  precise proportion not available. 
c.  First six months. 
Table 14 provides  two measures  of concession bargaining.  The first 
series shown  follows the same definition  used in my previous  study:  the 
proportion  of settlements  involving  a basic wage freeze or cut in the first 
contract  year. This series peaked in 1986  and had fallen to about  a fifth 
of new contracts  by the first half of 1989. However, freezes and cuts 
have become a progressively  upward-biased  index of concessions be- 
cause of the complexity of supplementary  provisions that are being 
negotiated.  Workers  who receive  no basic  wage  increase  may  still  receive 
first-year  income  increases  through  COLA  clauses, lump  sums, or  profit- 
sharing  payments,  for example. 
As a supplementary  measure,  therefore,  the table shows an index of 
concession severity  applying  to all contracts  with no positive base wage 
adjustments  in  the first  year. The severity  index  rates  contracts  from - 3 
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provisions. A wage decrease received a  - 2, a two-tier plan -  1, an 
active (nonfrozen)  COLA clause 1, a profit-sharing  plan 1, and lump- 
sum  bonus 1. As the table shows, concession severity-as  measured  by 
this admittedly  arbitrary  index-peaked in 1984.  The main  factor  reduc- 
ing severity has been the growing tendency to include lump sums in 
contracts with no base wage increase. This tendency was especially 
evident  during  the first  half of 1989  in the paper  and lumber  settlements 
that  accounted  for 33 percent  of the concessions of that  period. 
Apart from what can be seen directly in wage-change and wage 
concession indexes, the union sector is experiencing symptoms of 
increased  militancy  among  members  and  local officials.  There  have been 
increased  reports  of rejections  of, or resistance  to, contracts  negotiated 
by higher  union officials. These tendencies, illustrated  by the develop- 
ments listed in the appendix, are reminiscent  of similar  movements in 
the latter  half of the 1960s.  A key difference,  however, is that because 
of membership  losses, unions are not well positioned today to become 
independent  sources of wage pressure.  Most of the decline in unioniza- 
tion in the 1980s was not due to changing employment mix across 
industries. Over 80 percent of the drop in private sector unionization 
during 1980-88 (table 6) was due to  declining unionization within 
sectors.57  Thus, the level of nonunion  competition  faced by the typical 
union negotiator  is substantially  higher than it was in the 1960s. Not 
surprisingly  in  this environment,  surveyed  unionized  employers  indicate 
that they are increasingly  confident  of obtaining  their bargaining  goals 
in future  negotiations.58 
Conclusions 
In the 1960s,  wage inflation  accelerated  when the unemployment  rate 
fell toward  the bottom of the 4-5 percent range. By the late 1970s, the 
comparable  range  was 6-7 percent. And by the late 1980s,  it had fallen 
back  to an intermediate  5-6 percent. 
The comparatively  low levels to which unemployment  could fall in 
the 1960s  without  speeding  up inflation  were associated  with a big firm, 
57. Mitchell  (1989b). 
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big union  economy whose wage-setting  processes reacted sluggishly  to 
demand  pressure. The wage-price  guideposts program  and the greater 
regional  uniformity  of unemployment  rates  during  the 1960s  also retarded 
wage  inflation  as the  average  unemployment  rate  fell. The 1960s  economy 
was more  truly  macroeconomic  than  that  of the 1980s. 
It took time for wage setters, especially in the union sector, to adapt 
to the diversification  of the labor  market  that began in the 1970s.  Wage 
setters had to realize that CPI-measured  inflation  was not necessarily  a 
good  index  of employer  ability  (or  willingness)  to pay. The product  wage 
and  the real  wage might  move divergently.  Deterioration  of productivity 
growth  also caused confusion among  wage setters, by undermining  the 
basis of the "3 percent  plus COLA" notion. While  the learning  process 
was under way, the range of unemployment  in which inflation  would 
accelerate rose. Ultimately, the environment  became unfavorable  to 
sluggish  and slow-to-adapt  wage-setting  arrangements. 
During  the last half  of 1988  and  the first  half  of 1989,  as the unemploy- 
ment rate fell into the 5-5.5  percent range, signs of wage pressure 
appeared,  especially the rash of reports  of labor shortages.  The atmos- 
phere  became reminiscent  of 1965,  a year that can be seen in retrospect 
as a transition  to sustained  inflationary  problems.  But  there  is a difference 
between the mid-1960s  and the late 1980s. Changes in labor market 
institutions  have pushed wage setting in a more competitive  direction. 
While the labor market  is far from a textbook auction, in the current 
period  what  you get is what you see. Long lags are not likely to occur. 
In some respects, these circumstances  make  inflation  fighting  easier. 
If 5-5.5 percent  unemployment  is now the rate  that  triggers  accelerating 
inflation,  policymakers  will observe that fact fairly quickly. Federal 
Reserve policy did move toward  restraint,  especially in the first  half of 
1989.  The unemployment  rate stopped  falling, and wage-change  accel- 
eration  was checked. It will be evident soon enough if maintaining  the 
rate in the 5-5.5  percent range is  sufficient to contain inflationary 
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APPENDIX 
Recent Developments 
in the Union Sector 
FOLLOWING  ARE brief  descriptions  of selected union  actions  during  1988- 
89. 
Airlines.  Eastern  Airlines  workers  strike  to protest  demands  for wage 
and  other concessions beginning  March  1989.  Unions become involved 
in various  buyout  proposals  before  bankruptcy  court. 
Coal. United Mine Workers  strike  against  Pittston  Co., which broke 
away  from  employer  bargaining  group  and  did  not become  party  to group 
contract. Wildcat strikes and picketing  at other companies develop in 
spring  1989.  Violence erupts  at some sites. 
Electrical equipment.  Local union presidents recommend  rejection 
of GE contract negotiated in June 1988 by national officials of the 
Electronic  Workers.  Contract  is ultimately  ratified  by membership  after 
campaign  by national  union.  Workers  at former  RCA  TV manufacturing 
plants reject tentative agreement  reached by national  union with new 
owners (Thomson  Consumer  Electronics). 
Motor vehicles. 1988  Chrysler  contract  providing  no first-year  basic 
wage increase ratified  by close margin  despite national  union endorse- 
ment. Union officials express surprise  at narrow  vote. Skilled trades 
group  within  Chrysler  pushes for reopening  of new contract  but fails to 
convince national union. Dissident movement within Auto Workers 
develops opposing "team concept" and related  labor-management  co- 
operative devices, but fails to make significant  political gains within 
union. 
Retailfood. In Richmond,  Va., a three-year 1987  Safeway contract 
providing  for wage cuts is replaced  in early 1989  (well before  expiration) 
by a new agreement  providing  wage increases. The employer  explains 
that the new agreement would "reaffirm to . ..  employees  our commit- 
ment  to staying  in the area...." 
Rubber.  Goodyear  workers  reject  tentative 1988  agreement  between 
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eventually  settled  by renegotiated  contract  that  provided  an "advance" 
COLA  payment.  Other  companies  follow Goodyear  pattern. 
Steel. Workers  reject tentative settlement  at National Steel. A sub- 
sequently  renegotiated  contract  that  contained  what  the union  described 
as "slight  improvements"  was later  ratified. 
Telephones.  Tentative 1989  agreement  at GTE California  rejected  by 
union  members.  Renegotiated  contract  calls for wage increases  in place 
of lump sums. Subsequent negotiation  with Pacific Bell also leads to 
rejection  of tentative  contract. 
Trucking.  Members  reject  National  Master  Freight  Agreement  in  May 
1988  by 64 percent  vote. Union permits  contract  to go into effect despite 
vote because of internal  rule  that contract  rejections  require  two-thirds 
vote. Subsequent Carhaulers  pact, rejected by 72 percent vote and 
ultimately  renegotiated,  eliminates  provision  allowing  lower labor  costs 
for new routes. 